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THE  IMPACT  OF SCHREMS  II :  NEXT  STEPS  FOR
U.S.  DATA  PRIVACY  LAW
Andraya Flor*
INTRODUCTION
Each time a person goes online they leave a digital footprint, but that
does not mean they are aware of what that footprint contains.  For example,
some smartphone applications have location tracking set as a default, which
requires the user to have knowledge of this default setting in order to turn it
off.1  In the case of Strava, a popular fitness application that allows members
to share running routes with each other and compare fitness goals, the loca-
tion-sharing feature also publicized heat maps of runners’ routes that showed
the positions of military service members on U.S. bases abroad.2  Even where
location sharing does not implicate national security by showing exact sta-
tions of servicemembers, it raises serious privacy concerns when it reveals
information that the user did not know was accessible to others.3  Design
choices make it more difficult for users to become aware of what is happen-
ing with their personal information, and subsequently limit their ability to
exercise meaningful control over data collection even where applications
purport to give it to them.  The European Union’s comprehensive data pri-
vacy regulation, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), acknowl-
edges this defect in Article 25, titled “Data protection by design and by
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022; Bachelor of Science in
Commerce in Economics and Political Science, Santa Clara University, 2019.  I would like
to thank Professor Mark McKenna for his guidance and support in writing this Note and
would also like to thank my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent
edits.  Finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and support.  All errors are my
own.
1 Norway’s Consumer Council (Forbrukarrådet) released a report that concluded
that both Facebook and Google, as well as Microsoft, engage in deceptive design practices
to “nudge users toward privacy intrusive options.” FORBRUKARRÅDET, DECEIVED BY DESIGN 3
(2018), https://www.forbrukerradet.no/undersokelse/no-undersokelsekategori/deceived-
by-design/.  It found that Microsoft had the least privacy-intrusive settings of the three,
albeit based on less monetization of user data in their business model, but that Google and
Facebook had highly privacy-intrusive settings. Id. at 3, 11.
2 Fitness App Strava Lights Up Staff at Military Bases, BBC (Jan. 29, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/technology-42853072.
3 Harry Guinness, How to Stop Strava from Making Your Home Address Public, HOW-TO
GEEK (June 26, 2020), https://www.howtogeek.com/678870/how-to-stop-strava-from-mak-
ing-your-home-address-public/.
2035
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default,” which requires companies to implement upfront data protection
principles prior to processing personal data.4
Many in the United States also see comprehensive federal privacy legisla-
tion as necessary, including members of Congress who have introduced more
than thirty total bills regarding federal data privacy since 2018.5  The United
States has yet to act on the issue on a federal level,6 instead generally leaving
it to individual companies and states to determine their own privacy policies.
Generally, the U.S. approach to data collection is permissive with certain
exceptions and prohibitions.7  The EU took a different approach beginning
with the Data Privacy Directive in 1995, which is now in force as the General
Data Protection Regulation of 2018.8  In the EU, data processing is unlawful
unless the processor can first show one of the bases outlined in the GDPR as
a reason for collecting it.9
Although starting from different viewpoints, both systems recognize that
the companies who want to do business across their borders have to be per-
mitted to engage in cross-border data transfers in order to operate.  Under
the GDPR, a country must be deemed to have adequate data protection laws
before being allowed to receive data transfers from subjects located in the
European Union.10  The United States is not currently an adequate jurisdic-
4 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25, 2016
O.J. (L 119) 48 [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation].
5 See Müge Fazlioglu, Consolidating US Privacy Legislation: The SAFE DATA Act, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/consolidating-u-s-privacy-
legislation-the-safe-data-act/ (tracing the development of Republican-sponsored federal
data privacy act proposals in the Senate); see also Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, How the
2020 Elections Will Shape the Federal Privacy Debate, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/10/26/how-the-2020-elections-will-shape-the-
federal-privacy-debate/ (noting that reconciling the tensions between competing federal
privacy bills is an ongoing endeavor).
6 Some states have passed or attempted to pass their own data privacy laws, modeled
after the GDPR. See Sarah Rippy, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N
OF PRIV. PROS., https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ (last updated
Feb. 19, 2021).  For example, California passed the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA), which created a private right of action for California citizens to sue for certain
violations of data privacy protections. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.198 (West 2020).
7 See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUN-
CIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-
data-protection.
8 See Ernst-Oliver Wilhelm, A Brief History of the General Data Protection Regulation, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS., https://iapp.org/resources/article/a-brief-history-of-the-general-
data-protection-regulation/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
9 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The
European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. &
COMMC’NS TECH. L. 65, 76 (2019); William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58
ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 967–79 (2016) (contrasting the European model of data protection with
the American model based on consumer data privacy).
10 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 45(1).
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tion, resulting in the need for other agreements to facilitate business
between these markets.11  The first agreement, the Safe Harbor Agree-
ment,12 and then its replacement, Privacy Shield,13 both operated as volun-
tary self-certification programs for individual companies.14  Due to Austrian
data privacy activist Max Schrems, both agreements have been held invalid.15
First, the 2015 case of Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner
(Schrems I) invalidated the Safe Harbor Agreement,16 and later the 2020 case
of Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd.17 (Schrems II) did the
same to Privacy Shield, again casting uncertainty on the ability of companies
to engage in cross-border data transfers.  Privacy Shield had increased protec-
tions for EU data subjects and addressed some of the criticisms that led to
Safe Harbor’s collapse: for example, a Privacy Ombudsperson was created to
allow for additional oversight of data processing in the United States, and it
also broadened the remedies available in the United States for violations.18
Neither of these changes was enough to save it from being invalidated.  Now,
transfers of data from subjects located in the European Union to entities in
the United States are by definition unlawful if made solely in reliance on
Privacy Shield.19  Even if a third replacement agreement is reached soon,
there is no reason to believe it would not be subject to another challenge
from Schrems.
After Schrems II, standard contractual clauses (SCCs) remain a mecha-
nism for entities to transfer data across borders, referring to sets of specific
11 Currently, the European Commission has ruled that only twelve jurisdictions pro-
vide “adequate” data protection. See Adequacy Decisions, EUR. COMM’N, https://
ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protec-
tion/adequacy-decisions_en (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) (Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faroe
Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, and
Uruguay).
12 Commission Decision 2000/520 of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided
by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issues by
the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
13 Commission Implementing Decision  2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to Direc-
tive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the
Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1 [hereinafter Privacy
Shield Decision].
14 See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 793–95
(2019).
15 See Max Schrems, Foreword, The Privacy Shield Is a Soft Update of the Safe Harbor, 2
EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 148, 148–49 (2016) (arguing that the proposed Privacy Shield is
“an outright affront to the highest court of the European Union” and it “does not even
regulate the vast majority of processing operations by US controllers”).
16 Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 98 (Oct. 6, 2015).
17 Case C-311/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020).
18 Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 13, ¶¶ 116–17, 139.
19 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti & Mary T. Costigan, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Program for Transfer
of Personal Data to U.S. Found Invalid, JACKSONLEWIS (July 22, 2020), https://
www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/eu-us-privacy-shield-program-transfer-personal-data-us-
found-invalid.
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contractual language issued by the European Commission.20  Entities have
the option to enter into these agreements, which apply to only the signatories
and require the receiver of data, if outside the European Union, to comply
with the GDPR.21  Because many companies, especially multinational corpo-
rations, have relied on Privacy Shield with SCCs as a backstop in specific deal-
ings, it is probable that in the short term many business relationships may
continue relatively unaffected.22
Schrems II invalidated Privacy Shield because the court found that it did
not provide an “essentially equivalent” level of protection compared to the
guarantees of the GDPR.23  The National Security Agency (NSA) operated
surveillance programs that had the potential to infringe on the rights of EU
subjects, and there was a lack of oversight and effective judicial remedies to
protect rights of EU data subjects, which undermined Privacy Shield as a
mechanism for data transfers.24  This Note sets aside the surveillance and
national security issue, which would require resolution through a shift in
overall U.S. national security law, and instead focuses on the other problems
raised by Schrems II: how can the United States be considered an adequate
jurisdiction for GDPR purposes in order to facilitate cross-Atlantic data
transfers?
The most complete solution for the United States is a federal data pri-
vacy law that will lead the United States to be deemed an adequate jurisdic-
tion.  Standard contractual clauses are insufficient as the sole basis of reliance
for data transfers across the Atlantic for two reasons.  First, Schrems II impli-
cates the adequacy of data protection laws of jurisdictions even in the context
of SCCs, placing the burden on individual companies to assess the relative
adequacy of data privacy laws.  Second, SCCs bind only the individual signato-
ries such that they cannot create “adequacy” for the United States as a whole.
Part I provides context for the approach to data privacy in the United
States compared to the system in the European Union.  Part II analyzes why
Schrems I invalidated Safe Harbor and how it created the standard that
Schrems II later applied to also invalidate Privacy Shield.  Part II also outlines
20 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 46; Schrems II,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 132–35.  Along with standard contractual clauses, binding corpo-
rate rules remain another option for companies and were not directly addressed in Schrems
II.  Binding corporate rules are internal policies that must be approved by the supervisory
authority.  General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 47.  Binding corporate
rules are designed to allow multinational companies to transfer data among their own
affiliates that are located outside of the European Union. Binding Corporate Rules (BCR),
EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-
dimension-data-protection/binding-corporate-rules-bcr_en (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
21 See Claude-Étienne Armingaud, Laure Comparet & Violaine Selosse, EU Data Protec-
tion: Standard Contractual Clauses May Have Been Confirmed by the CJEU, But at What Price?,
K&L GATES HUB (July 17, 2020), https://www.klgates.com/eu-data-protection-standard-
contractual-clauses-may-have-been-confirmed-by-the-cjeu-but-at-what-price-07-17-2020.
22 See id.
23 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 181.
24 Id. ¶ 191.
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the risks of future use of standard contractual clauses as a means to transfer
data between the United States and the European Union without a U.S. fed-
eral privacy law.  Part III takes a step back to address how the pace of techno-
logical development and nature of the internet require that data privacy be
addressed at the federal level while also discussing easing the path toward
adequacy.  Lastly, Part IV presents possible solutions to the lack of harmony
among data privacy laws in the U.S. and argues that a federal U.S. data pri-
vacy law is the best solution for businesses because it will provide a central-
ized standard on which to base their operations.
Before examining the impact of Schrems II on the data privacy frame-
work, it is necessary to define a few key terms as used in the rest of this Note.
Data privacy law is separate from cybersecurity law.  Broadly, data privacy law
seeks to provide rights centered around the use of personal data by compa-
nies, while cybersecurity law deals with unauthorized access of data and the
consequences of large-scale data breaches.25  Though distinct, both areas
address the accessibility of personal data and, in addition, having strong data
privacy regimes can help reduce the negative impacts of data breaches.26
Although California’s influence is growing,27 the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation functions as the current standard for global data privacy
law.28  Therefore, the use of the term “personal data” throughout this Note
means the definition provided by the GDPR.  “Personal data” under the
GDPR “means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natu-
ral person (‘data subject’)” including indicators “such as name, an identifica-
tion number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person.”29  The GDPR also provides further
restrictions for special categories of personal data in Article 9, which prohib-
its all processing of these types of information with a more limited scope of
potential exceptions for collecting it.30  The GDPR takes an expansive view of
the term “personal data,” where virtually any identifier could conceivably
come under that definition.31
25 See What Does Privacy Mean?, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS., https://iapp.org/about/
what-is-privacy/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2020).
26 See id.
27 See Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy
Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1734 (2021).
28 See id. 1735–36.
29 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 4.
30 Id. art. 9 (prohibiting collection of data regarding racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the process-
ing of genetic data, biometric data, data concerning health, or data concerning sexual
orientation).
31 See Hoofnagle, et al., supra note 9, at 72–73 (“[E]very datum that identifies a person
or could identify a person in the future is personal data.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 6 11-MAY-21 9:09
2040 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
I. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO DATA PRIVACY IS FRAGMENTED
COMPARED TO THE COMPREHENSIVE GDPR
The rights of a data subject in the European Union are approached
from a fundamentally different framework than in the United States.32  The
United States starts from the presumption that data collection and process-
ing are permitted with industry-specific regulation, and the European Union
presumes that data processing is unlawful unless certain conditions are met
upfront.  First, this Part will provide an overview of the state of data privacy
law in the United States with a focus on the California Consumer Privacy Act
as the first comprehensive attempt at data privacy regulation in the United
States, and second, it will move to the EU’s approach.
A. The United States and the “Right to Privacy”
In the United States, data protection is segmented by industry and
closely related to consumer protection.  Under the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), for example, healthcare data of
individuals is strictly regulated.33  The Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (“FERPA”) governs student education data and imposes restrictions on
outside access to a student’s school records without the student’s consent,
and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) provides protec-
tions for collection of information from children under age thirteen.34
Outside of these sector-specific areas, the Federal Trade Commission acts as
the federal agency that enforces data privacy violations.35  However, there is
no unifying or comprehensive U.S. federal data privacy law and no federal
private right of action.36
Because of this fragmented approach, there is a question of where a
right to any level of data privacy might originate.  Some have theorized that
there may be a right to data privacy as part of the Fourth Amendment’s right
to reasonable expectation of privacy, or at least in the right against unlawful
32 But see Schwartz, supra note 14, at 773 (noting that after the passage of the GDPR,
industry experts in the United States began to adopt the language of the EU regarding
rights to data privacy).
33 Michael D. Kummer & Kristin M. Hadgis, Data Privacy at a Crossroads, 71 TAX EXEC.,
Nov./Dec. 2019, at 48, 50.
34 See id.
35 The Department of Health and Human Services is authorized under HIPAA to pro-
mulgate privacy rules, and the Department of Education is authorized under FERPA to
regulate student records. See McGeveran, supra note 9, at 997.  Tying the FTC to data
privacy reinforces the consumer-based market approach to data regulation that the United
States has thus far followed. See id. at 998–99.
36 See Chander et al., supra note 27, at 1737; Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., In
Privacy Legislation, a Private Right of Action Is Not an All-or-Nothing Proposition, BROOKINGS
INST. (July 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/07/07/in-privacy-
legislation-a-private-right-of-action-is-not-an-all-or-nothing-proposition/.
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search and seizure.37  However, this line of inquiry is tenuous and there are
many exceptions to the prohibition on unlawful search and seizure.38  Even
if a right to data privacy is found to originate there, it is unlikely to have
robust implications because of the already weak status of the general right to
privacy; these rights only arise in response to criminal charges and are not
generally otherwise enforceable against the state.39  Although the United
States does not have a federal data privacy right, several states have begun to
fill the gap with legislation that confers certain rights to consumers regarding
the management of their personal information.  California enacted the Cali-
fornia Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which went into effect in 2020 and at
the time of passage was the first state effort toward a comprehensive data
privacy regime.40  The CCPA is loosely modeled after the GDPR and brings
some of the same principles into its own framework, although it maintains a
consumer protection perspective.
For example, the CCPA defines personal information as “information
that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
consumer or household.”41  The Act goes on to list types of information that
would fall within that definition, such as biometric information, geolocation
data, and other identifiers, as well as inferences drawn from that data to cre-
ate a profile about the consumer.42  Similar to the GDPR’s definition of per-
sonal data, the CCPA defines the scope of the provision broadly and
encompasses a wide spectrum of information.  Based on the text alone, the
CCPA may go farther than the GDPR and include personal information at
the household or device level, and not just the individual.43  However, the
CCPA is more limited in its enforcement ability.  It regulates a narrower set
of entities and confers a different scope of rights to consumers compared to
37 See McGeveran, supra note 9, at 976 (noting United States cases that outline broad
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of a right to privacy and contrasting those with cases
where the Supreme Court declined to read a broader right to data protection into this
right of privacy).
38 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1536
(2010). See generally Gavin Skok, Establishing A Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream
Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 61 (2000) (describing the history of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence within the context of clickstream data collection and advocat-
ing a nuanced approach as technology continues to evolve).
39 See Solove, supra note 38, at 1521–26 (advocating a reassessment of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence).
40 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (West
2020); see also Kummer & Hadgis, supra note 33, at 50 (noting that the passage of the
California Consumer Privacy Act “reflects a developing trend toward regulating personal
data and protecting the privacy of residents”).
41 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020).
42 Id. § 1798.140(o)(A)–(K).
43 See LAURA JEHL & ALAN FRIEL, CCPA AND GDPR COMPARISON CHART, PRACTICAL LAW
CHART w-016-7418 2 (2018), https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Privacy/2018/Articles/
CCPA-GDPR-Chart.pdf.
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the GDPR.44  Notably, both contain a private right of action although the
CCPA’s is much narrower.45
The CCPA provides a limited private right of action for California citi-
zens “[t]o recover damages in an amount not less than one hundred dollars
($100) and not greater than seven hundred and fifty ($750) per consumer
per incident or actual damages, whichever is greater” or injunctive relief.46
Consumers may exercise this right if their nonredacted personal information
is “subject to an unauthorized access . . . or disclosure” as a result of the
business’s failure to implement reasonable security practices.47  This action is
based on a narrower definition of personal information than that set out in
the CCPA, instead using the definition from the California Customer
Records Act that requires a first and last name in combination with another
data element to constitute personal information.48  Although it exists, the
CCPA private right of action is restrictive and has yet to be tested extensively
in court.49
In November 2020, California voters approved an update to the CCPA
called the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA).50  The CPRA makes substan-
tial changes to the enforcement structure of data privacy in the state and will
take full effect on January 1, 2023.51  The most significant change is the crea-
tion of the California Privacy Protection Agency, which has the authority to
create additional data privacy regulations and will replace the California
Attorney General’s office in enforcing them.52  The Attorney General’s office
will retain the ability to bring civil enforcement actions, but the other admin-
istrative powers will move to the new agency.53  This change makes Califor-
44 Id. at 1, 5–7.  The GDPR has a “much broader” scope and territorial reach and
stronger right to erasure than the CCPA. Id. at 1.  The CCPA has no right to restrict
processing and no right to object to automated decisionmaking, where the GDPR allows it
under certain circumstances. Id. at 5.  Finally, the GDPR establishes a private right of
action for “material or non-material damage caused by . . . data processors[’] breach of the
GDPR” while the CCPA has a narrower right for breaches involving a “sub-set of personal
information.” Id. at 6.  However, though “[s]ubstantially different in scope,” violations of
either law can result in “significant economic liability.” Id.
45 Id.
46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2020).
47 Id. § 1798.150(a)(1).
48 Id. § 1798.81.5(d)(1).
49 Cathy Cosgrove, CCPA Litigation: Shaping the Contours of the Private Right of Action,
INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (June 8, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/ccpa-litigation-shap-
ing-the-contours-of-the-private-right-of-action/#:~:text=section%201798.150(a)(1,and
%20maintain%20reasonable%20security%20procedures.
50 See California Voters Adopt the California Privacy Rights Act, JONES DAY INSIGHTS (Nov.
2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/11/california-voters-approve-cpra.
51 Id.
52 See id.; California Officials Announce California Privacy Protection Agency Board Appoint-
ments, CA.GOV (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2021/03/17/california-officials-
announce-california-privacy-protection-agency-board-appointments/ [hereinafter Califor-
nia Officials Announce] (listing the new members of the CPPA board).
53 California Officials Announce, supra note 52.
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nia’s data privacy scheme more closely reflect the GDPR by creating a
separate enforcement agency.  CPRA also expands the private right of action
definition of personal information to include the combination of an email or
username and password (i.e., login credentials to an online account),
although it still does not use the actual CCPA definition.54
One possible consequence of the CCPA/CPRA is that it becomes the
equivalent of the GDPR in the United States and the de facto standard under
which U.S. companies operate.  Because it covers California citizens, which
make up a significant consumer base in the United States, many companies
will default to the CCPA standards across the United States.55  Residents of
other states will enjoy the benefit of a company that complies with the CCPA
in all of its internal policies, although they will not be able to access the
enforcement mechanisms because the CCPA only provides these rights to
California citizens.56  This outcome still has the benefit that other citizens in
practice are afforded stronger data protection rights than they would have
otherwise been able to access.  Another outcome is that other states will fol-
low suit and enact their own privacy laws: twenty-seven states introduced com-
prehensive data privacy regulation between 2018 and 2020.57  The result will
be data privacy laws that may be substantially similar but vary in certain
details or requirements, contributing to the existing lack of harmony in data
privacy law within the United States.58
B. European Union Approach to Data Privacy
Privacy rights in the European Union are rooted in “individual dignity”
rather than consumer protections.59  The EU Charter of Human Rights
54 Peter Hegel, Sundeep Kapur & Claire Blakey, The California Privacy Rights Act
(CPRA) Has Been Enacted into Law, PAUL HASTINGS (Nov. 6, 2020), https://
www.paulhastings.com/insights/ph-privacy/blog-the-california-privacy-rights-act-cpra-has-
been-enacted-into-law.
55 See Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits
of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1712 (2020).
56 See id. at 1692; see also California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN.
OF CAL., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
57 Rippy, supra note 6 (noting that Texas, Hawaii, and Louisiana are using task forces
instead of considering a comprehensive bill).  In addition to California, three states,
Nevada, Maine, and Virginia, have already enacted their own state-wide data privacy legisla-
tion. Id.  Washington state has introduced its own draft bill, and eight other states have
data privacy bills in committee. Id.
58 See id.  For example, almost all of the proposed and enacted state bills include a
right for the consumer to opt out of the sale of their personal information to third par-
ties—with exceptions, like Maine and Massachusetts, which reframe the process as requir-
ing consumers to opt in to data sharing up front. Id.  Although these states may not be
large markets relative to the populations of other states like California, this example is
illustrative of the potential discrepancies in privacy bills among states.
59 McGeveran, supra note 9, at 967.
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includes an explicit right to data privacy.60  Starting with this framework, the
Data Privacy Directive, which later became the GDPR, requires a legitimate
basis before data processing begins.61  The GDPR continues this conception
of data privacy in its principles of data minimization, data accuracy, and pur-
pose-driven limits on controllers and processors to only collect and store
what is necessary.62  It prohibits broad data collection unless the data proces-
sor can show one of several legitimate bases for collection, in contrast to the
initial U.S. presumption that data processing is permitted.63  One of the key
implications of the language of the GDPR is that it applies to the processing
of data of any identifiable natural person located within the European
Union—it is not limited to protecting only citizens of EU member states and
instead operates based on the location of the person.64
The GDPR is built on expansive definitions that cover a wide scope of
digital activity.  Data “processing” means any operation, using automated or
nonautomated means, “performed on personal data or on sets of personal
data, . . . [such as] collection, . . . storage, . . . use, disclosure . . . or otherwise
making [it] available.”65  A key aspect of this definition is that it includes
both automated and nonautomated means of data collection, which encom-
passes a broad range of potential actions.  A data “controller” is “the natural
or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which . . . determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”66  A data con-
troller is not always the same as the processor, which is the “natural or legal
person, public authority, agency or other body” that “processes personal data
on behalf of the controller.”67  This distinction is meaningful because an
entity that is not directly collecting or controlling the intake of personal data
is still subject to the GDPR when it stores or otherwise uses data from a con-
troller.  Whether an entity functions as a processor or a controller does not
result in a different standard of conduct in the context of cross-border trans-
60 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
391, 397 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or
her. . . .  Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.  Every-
one has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and
the right to have it rectified. . . .  Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by
an independent authority.”); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputa-
tion.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”).
61 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 5; supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
62 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 5.
63 See McGeveran, supra note 9, at 977 (describing the dominant U.S. approach as
assessing transactions for their unfairness rather than focusing on individual rights).
64 See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 9, at 74.
65 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
66 Id. art. 4(7).
67 Id. art. 4(8).
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fers: both types of operations still must comply with the terms of the GDPR
when located outside of the European Union and receiving data from sub-
jects in the European Union.68
Lastly, the GDPR defines “recipient” as “a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or another body, to which the personal data are disclosed,
whether a third party or not.”69  This means that the GDPR applies not only
directly to controllers and processors but also to third parties authorized by
those entities to process the data.  These definitions demonstrate the wide
scope of potential entities that are subject to the GDPR, even if they are not
engaging directly in economic activity in the European Union.  The GDPR’s
potential application to data processors, controllers, and third parties
increases the practical effect of these provisions and impacts the develop-
ment of privacy law around the world, which is necessarily in response to this
broad framework.70
In order to transfer personal data out of the European Union, a country
must have an adequacy decision that certifies the data protection level of the
country.  If there is no adequacy decision, there are several options remain-
ing for companies that are located in a jurisdiction that has yet to be deemed
adequate.71  Processing is “lawful” only if the data subject consents or if it is
necessary for one of the following reasons: performance of a contract, to pro-
tect vital interests of the data subject or somebody else, to comply with a
controller’s legal obligations, for a task in the public interest, or in further-
ance of legitimate interests to the extent the interest is not overridden by
fundamental rights of the data subject.72  The two bases of compliance with
legal obligations and necessary for the public interest can only be predicated
on European Union law or European Union Member state law “to which the
controller is subject,”73 meaning that companies cannot rely on their own
national laws to show that processing is lawful.  Enforcement under the
GDPR is governed by independent national data protection authorities
located in the individual member states.74  The potential fines that compa-
nies may face for noncompliance are evaluated on a case-by-case basis and
can reach up to four percent of the preceding year’s global revenue.75
The GDPR’s broad provisions further the goals of the EU approach to
data privacy as rooted in individual dignity by requiring compliance with spe-
cific conditions before data processing becomes lawful, thus defining the
context that informed both the Schrems I and Schrems II decisions.
68 Id. art. 3(2) (“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data
subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the
Union . . . .”).
69 Id. art 4(9).
70 See generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012).
71 See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 9, at 83–85 (discussing the GDPR’s requirements for
permitting cross-border data transfers where there is not an adequacy decision).
72 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 6.
73 Id. art. 6(3)(a)–(b).
74 Id. art. 51; see also McGeveran, supra note 9, at 970.
75 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 83(2)–(6).
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II. MAX SCHREMS AND THE END OF SAFE HARBOR AND PRIVACY SHIELD
Because of these distinct approaches to regulating data privacy, the
United States and European Union have negotiated agreements so that busi-
nesses can operate in both markets without incurring liability.76  The first
agreement, Safe Harbor, was enacted to facilitate these cross-border transfers
in a legal regime that balanced the privacy interests of individuals with the
needs of commerce.77  This Part traces the timeline of the invalidation of
Safe Harbor and its subsequent replacement, Privacy Shield, in the Court of
Justice of the European Union based on the efforts of data activist Max
Schrems.
A. Schrems I Invalidates Safe Harbor
In Maximillian Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner (Schrems I),
decided in 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) found
that the Safe Harbor Agreement did not ensure “an adequate level of protec-
tion” for data transfers under the Data Privacy Directive (now the GDPR) to
the United States.78  The CJEU held that the standard under the General
Data Privacy Directive is that a country’s level of data protection must be
“essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue
of Directive 95/46 read in light of the [EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights].”79  Schrems argued that Facebook Ireland’s data transfers out of Ire-
land to Facebook in the United States should be prohibited because of evi-
dence that the NSA had near unrestricted access to that information, which
was revealed by Edward Snowden.80  Schrems successfully argued that the
Safe Harbor Agreement was an insufficient mechanism to protect the data of
those located in the European Union.81  The CJEU agreed with Schrems on
the grounds that Safe Harbor had too many loopholes for United States sur-
veillance operations and that public authorities were not required to comply
at all.82  While Schrems I was specifically concerned with the activities of U.S.
mass surveillance operations by various branches of the government, it also
was more broadly aimed at protecting the rights of EU data subjects when
76 See Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 1706–09.
77 Id. at 1707; see also Daniel Alvarez, Safe Harbor Is Dead; Long Live the Privacy Shield?,
BUS. L. TODAY, May 2016, at 1, 1.
78 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I),
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 97–98 (Oct. 6, 2015); see Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in
EU Data Transfer Regulation Post Schrems, 18 GERMAN L.J. 881, 882 (2017).
79 Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 73 (emphasis added).  Currently, the European
Commission has ruled that only twelve jurisdictions provide “adequate” data protection.
See Adequacy Decisions, supra note 11.
80 Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 85–86; Chander et al., supra note 27, at 1768; see
also Kuner, supra note 78, at 890 (clarifying that the judgment did not explicitly rule that
U.S. law was inadequate, but the discussion of U.S. intelligence gathering implies a strong
condemnation of the effect of those practices on rights of EU data subjects).
81 Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 106.
82 See Alvarez, supra note 77, at 1–2.
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their data is transferred to private U.S. companies, and in its aftermath impli-
cated an estimated five thousand companies and organizations.83  Some have
argued that the CJEU extended the meaning of the Directive (now GDPR)
too far, such that it imputed EU law onto other sovereign states in violation
of international law principles.84
In response to the invalidation of Safe Harbor, the European Union and
United States negotiated the Privacy Shield Decision as a replacement agree-
ment designed to answer the concerns outlined in Schrems I.85  Privacy Shield
contained significant changes to address the handling of Europeans’ per-
sonal data, U.S. government access to that data, and general protection of
EU citizens’ rights.86  These changes included representations that the U.S.
national security programs would be limited and created a Privacy Ombud-
sperson designed to be an independent oversight mechanism for complaints
against those programs.87  Additionally, Privacy Shield required companies
that chose to certify with the program to follow seven data privacy principles
in all their transactions “to foster, promote, and develop international com-
merce” between the two jurisdictions.88
B. Schrems II Invalidates Privacy Shield
Max Schrems again triumphed over privacy agreements between the
United States and European Union in 2020.89  In Data Protection Commissioner
v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. (Schrems II), the court addressed the adequacy of pro-
tection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.90  Schrems requested the
data commissioner “prohibit or suspend the transfer by Facebook Ireland of
his personal data to Facebook Inc., established in the United States, on the
ground that that third country did not ensure an adequate level of protec-
tion.”91  In the judgment issued by the Commission, the court reiterated the
goals of EU data protection based on safeguarding the fundamental rights
and freedoms of persons in the European Union.92  The court also discussed
83 Id.
84 See Christina Lam, Comment, Unsafe Harbor: The European Union’s Demand for Height-
ened Data Privacy Standards in Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner, 40 B.C. INT’L
& COMPAR. L. REV. ELEC. SUPPLEMENT 1, 10 (2017) (arguing that the meaning of “adequate
level of data protection” should be “sufficient” instead of “essentially equivalent” to mini-
mize the burden on other countries and maintain the spirit of the Data Privacy Directive).
For a discussion of the “Brussels Effect” as a theory of how the European Union’s actions in
practical effect unilaterally regulate global markets, see generally Bradford, supra note 70.
85 See Lam, supra note 84, at 7; Alvarez, supra note 77, at 2–3.
86 Alvarez, supra note 77, at 2–3.
87 Id.
88 Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 13, annex II, at 48–52.
89 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II),
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 ¶ 203 (July 16, 2020).
90 Id. ¶ 68(9)–(10).
91 Id. ¶ 159.
92 Id. ¶ 8.
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how U.S. intelligence operations undermined the principles of the GDPR,
specifically in the context of an effective judicial remedy.93
The CJEU affirmed the requirement that data protection must be
“essentially equivalent” to the GDPR to be considered an “adequate” level of
protection, as first outlined in Schrems I.94  According to the court, Privacy
Shield allowed U.S. national security and public interest concerns to take
primacy over the limiting principles in Privacy Shield.95  The United States
argued that Privacy Shield did provide adequate data protection because of
the representations the United States made in the Privacy Shield Decision
itself.96  Both parties agreed to the initial Decision in spite of the national
security concerns because the activity of United States surveillance operations
was “limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in
question.”97  The referring court questioned the adequacy of this limitation
and the effectiveness of “judicial protection against such interferences”
where the creation of a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson to ensure compliance
still did not meet the GDPR requirements.98
Privacy Shield was held inadequate because it was not “essentially
equivalent” to the level of data protection provided by the GDPR: the United
States did not have effective and enforceable rights for data subjects in the
European Union.99  Similar to Schrems I, the court was concerned with the
United States’ ability to circumvent the protections in the GDPR through
national security interests.100  The practical effect of the decision renders
data transfers between the European Union and United States uncertain.
Because of Schrems II and the lack of an adequacy decision for the United
States under the GDPR, data transfers between the two jurisdictions are
unlawful unless companies utilize one of two other existing mechanisms:
standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules.  And as the CJEU in
Schrems II provides, standard contractual clauses entail an examination of the
adequacy of the third country’s level of data protection.
93 Id. ¶¶ 187–89, 191–92; id. ¶ 194 (“An examination of whether the ombudsperson
mechanism which is the subject of the Privacy Shield Decision is in fact capable of address-
ing the Commission’s finding of limitations on the right to judicial protection must . . .
start from the premiss [sic] that data subjects must have the possibility of bringing legal
action before an independent and impartial court in order to have access to their personal
data, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data.”).
94 Id. ¶ 94.
95 Id. ¶¶ 163–64.
96 Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 13, ¶¶ 125–34.
97 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 167.
98 See id. ¶¶ 168, 195–97 (noting that the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson reports to the
Secretary of State and is not independent of the executive, and therefore is incapable of
fully addressing the rights of data subjects).
99 Id. ¶¶ 64–65; id. ¶¶ 187–88 (“[L]egislation not providing for any possibility for an
individual to pursue legal remedies . . . does not respect the essence of the fundamental
right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the [EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights].”); see also Lam, supra note 84, at 13 (predicting that the European
Union may invalidate Privacy Shield).
100 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 191–92.
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C. Schrems II Undermines Reliance on Standard Contractual Clauses as a
Sufficient Lawful Basis for Cross-Border Data Transfers
The referring court in Schrems II also requested a ruling on whether stan-
dard contractual clauses provided adequate data protection.  The referring
court’s belief was that the clauses did not rise to the “essentially equivalent”
level of protection compared to the GDPR, but was uncertain as to whether
the Commission could prohibit transfers that relied on these clauses based
on the incompatible state of the law in the third country.101  In particular,
the referring court asked what factors should be considered for determining
adequacy of protection with standard contractual clauses as the basis for the
data transfer.102
In the Schrems II judgment, the CJEU affirmed the validity of the stan-
dard contractual clauses.  It also stated that, although the GDPR was silent on
this specific issue, that to assess the adequacy of the level of data protection
in a country under these particular transfers the relevant question is whether
data subjects are “afforded appropriate safeguards, enforceable rights and
effective legal remedies.”103  The consequence of this inquiry is that where a
country does not have an adequacy decision and is deemed so inadequate
such that a company cannot be in compliance with the GDPR even using
SCCs, a Data Protection Authority “is required to suspend or prohibit a trans-
fer of data to [that] third country.”104
Schrems II casts doubt on the long-term viability of reliance solely on
SCCs for data transfers, especially in light of the referring court’s doubts
about the validity of these clauses that reflect general distrust of their effec-
tiveness to secure data protection for EU data subjects.  Even where SCCs are
in place, a company is still subject to the adequacy level of the country to
which they are transferring the personal data.105  The court went on to con-
clude that because SCCs are only binding on the involved parties and create
obligations for those parties only, “it may prove necessary to supplement the
guarantees contained in those standard data protection clauses.”106  The
European Data Protection Board (EDPB), which administers the GDPR, has
101 Id. ¶¶ 68, 90.
102 Id. ¶ 90.
103 Id. ¶¶ 103, 105 (noting that this inquiry includes assessment of the level of access by
public authorities to the data and the legal system of the receiving country).
104 Id. ¶ 121 (emphasis added).
105 See Carol A.F. Umhoefer & Andrew Serwin, Schrems II: Now What?  New FAQs from
EU Data Protection Supervisors Provide Guidance on Data Transfers, DLA PIPER (July 28, 2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/07/schrems-ii-now-what-
new-faqs-from-eu-data-protection-supervisors-provide-guidance-on-data-transfers/.
106 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 132.  This determination is tempered by the
court’s decision not to extend the period of applicability for Privacy Shield to allow compa-
nies to find alternatives, instead finding that the decision would not create a “legal vac-
uum” because other mechanisms for data transfers would still allow them to proceed.  Id.
¶ 202.  By not creating an extension for Privacy Shield, the court signaled that reliance on
procedures such as standard contractual clauses could be a sufficient lawful basis alone in
certain cases for data transfers, even without supplements.
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published recommendations for comment on supplementary measures to
help companies if they are unsure about the level of data privacy in their
jurisdiction.107  These recommendations include technical measures, addi-
tional contractual measures, increased transparency, and other organiza-
tional suggestions.108
Setting aside the national security concerns that were part of the CJEU’s
rationale, Schrems II has two key findings.  First, the court’s judgment not only
permits but requires data protection authorities to suspend the data transfer
if they determine the transfer did not take place under an “essentially
equivalent” process as guaranteed by the GDPR.  Second, companies are not
able to escape an adequacy inquiry into the laws of the country they are
located in based on their use of standard GDPR contractual clauses and must
still evaluate the overall context of the transfer—the level of privacy safe-
guards of their jurisdiction—and determine if supplements to the standard
contractual clauses are necessary.109  The CJEU declined to create a grace
period for enforcement as had occurred when Safe Harbor was eliminated,
and as of the judgment all data transfers based solely on Privacy Shield are
unlawful.110  Consequently, the United States is now in a position to reevalu-
ate its data privacy governance mechanisms to continue to facilitate cross-
border transfers of personal data and should take advantage of it, or con-
tinue to have its adequacy evaluated on a case-by-case basis in EU courts.
III. RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IS A REASON TO ENACT
CENTRALIZED PROTECTIONS
Schrems II created uncertainty with regard to the state of data privacy
transfers between the United States and European Union and continues to
elevate the GDPR as a prominent data privacy governance mechanism in the
international community.  However, it also created an opportunity to evalu-
ate the role of the GDPR compared to the sectoral approach of the United
States.  The United States’ approach to privacy promotes flexibility and
industry-specific standards that may be more easily updated with the fast pace
of technological development.  An example of rapid technological develop-
ment is seen in the area of location tracking, where recent lawsuits include
the City of Los Angeles’s suit against the Weather Channel for passing its
users’ location data on to outside entities.111  The reality is that GDPR is in
107 EUR. DATA PROT. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS 01/2020 ON MEASURES THAT SUPPLEMENT
TRANSFER TOOLS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF PERSONAL
DATA 2 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/consultation/edpb_recom
mendations_202001_supplementarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf.
108 Id. at 21–37.
109 See Lazzarotti & Costigan, supra note 19 (“SCCs may not be an adequate transfer
mechanism in every case, or they may require the negotiation of additional provisions to
satisfy these obligations.”).
110 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 203.
111 See Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, What Is It About Location?, 35 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 251, 260–61 (2020).
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force and its current effect is the de facto governing international standard
for data privacy law, rendering private companies located in the United
States subject to its provisions if they want to transfer personal data out of the
European Union.112
Because the internet lacks territorial bounds, it is difficult to conceptual-
ize a national law in this area that functionally could be limited to certain
borders, given the multinational operations of most companies.  The fast-
paced development of technology means that regulators are often playing
catch-up, and the GDPR’s starting premise forces those innovations to con-
sider the effect on an individual’s personal data.113  While states may imple-
ment laws that conflict and differ, the internet is distinctive because of its
significant position in facilitating commerce and requires a centralized regu-
lation.114  The growing number of state data privacy bills reveals a trend that
the United States should take advantage of to institute a centralized federal
data privacy regulation, rather than continuing with the segmented
approach.  The proliferation of “mini-GDPRs”115 is overall a detriment to the
system of cross-border commerce, including across state borders within the
United States.
In order to be deemed “adequate,” the European Commission must
issue an adequacy decision based on the examination of the following factors
in the third country: rule of law, respect for human rights, national security,
existence of independent supervisory authorities, and other international
commitments the country has entered into.116  Standard contractual clauses
are also insufficient to deem the United States or other jurisdictions ade-
quate because they bind only the individual signatories and do not relate to
the factors laid out in GDPR Article 45.  Either a third country, a territory or
one or more specific sectors within that third country, or an international
organization may be deemed to have an adequate level of data protection,
although thus far only countries and their dependencies have been deemed
adequate.117  Because of the “essentially equivalent” standard established in
Schrems I and II, the EU has set a high standard for other jurisdictions.
In the aftermath of Schrems II, and taken in the context of state-level
developments of privacy law in the United States, the need for the United
States to address the issue on the federal level becomes much stronger.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ENACT A FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY LAW
Schrems II leaves open only two mechanisms for lawful cross-border trans-
fers of personal data into the United States: using either standard contractual
clauses or binding corporate rules.118  As discussed in Part II, even though
112 See Bradford, supra note 70, at 3–4.
113 See Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 111, at 255–57, 265–66.
114 See Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 1737.
115 Id. at 1712–13.
116 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 45.
117 See Adequacy Decisions, supra note 11.
118 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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these devices remain in place (along with user consent) reliance on them
entails increased costs for businesses through implementation of individual
contracts or creates only a limited scope of binding corporate rules.  By evalu-
ating standard contractual clauses on a case-by-case basis and in light of the
laws of the jurisdiction in which the company operates, Schrems II narrows
even the use of these options to facilitate lawful transfers of personal data
into the United States.  A company that believed it followed the lawful use of
SCCs may still find cross-border transfers that it relies on terminated by data
protection authorities, reinforcing the need for the United States to address
this issue.
The first Section of this Part addresses why data privacy governance is
necessary at all, through ex ante regulation and principles of privacy by
design and increased user control over personal data.  The second Section
applies these theories to the current state of privacy law in the United States
and addresses why federal action is the better route than both a third itera-
tion of a framework similar to Privacy Shield and continued state-by-state
legislation.
A. The Burden to Safeguard Data Privacy Should Be on Those in the Best
Position to Address It: The Controllers and Processors
  Personal data is accessible and for sale in almost any online transaction.119
It should be protected through centralized regulation rather than leaving it
to individual parties to safeguard it because there is a “larger social value” to
defending privacy.120  Individual decisions regarding consent to data collec-
tion may “not collectively yield the most desirable social outcome,” and the
future of data processing does not show signs of slowing down.121  Further-
more, reliance on consent and control of the user is undermined by the
user’s lack of information relative to the data collector and deceptive design
practices when asking for user consent, reinforcing the value of having legis-
lated protections at all.
1. Upfront Data Privacy Protection Will Address the Social Value of
Safeguarding Personal Data
Some U.S. technology companies advocate a control-based theory of pri-
vacy regulation.122  Scholars have argued that reliance solely on user control
is misplaced and an ineffective means to address access to personal data,
instead advocating a model with “a baseline, fundamental level of protection
119 See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881, 1888–89 (2013).
120 Id. at 1881.
121 Id.; see Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 1725 (“We are only beginning to assess
the human and social costs of platform dominance and massive-scale data processing.”).
122 See Woodrow Hartzog, Opinion, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA
PROT. L. REV. 423, 423–24 (2018).  Both Facebook and Microsoft contain language in their
privacy statements that reference user control. Id.
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regardless of what they choose.”123  Most people do not want to
micromanage their data due to the problem of scale in the thousands of
online interactions that occur each day.124  A 2008 study estimated that the
opportunity cost in time spent to actually read the privacy policy once for
each website visited in a year would be about $781 billion,125 reinforcing the
view that the burden to address these concerns should not be on the individ-
ual consumer.  The additional problem with relying on user exercise of con-
trol is that the choice is not freely made because technology companies use
design mechanisms to incentivize certain decisions; thus, laws curated to user
choice are “deficient because [they] ignore[ ] design.”126  By regulating
through design rather than user control, there is increased ability to have
effective protection for consumers.
Proponents of the user control and transparency approach rely on con-
sumers exercising their data privacy rights and on those rights being effec-
tive.127  This approach places lower weight on the information asymmetry
between the user and the company and argues that stronger enforcement
mechanisms and routes for private individuals to obtain control will maxi-
mize the value of personal data for everyone.128  Rather than making the
judgment that a user’s choice to prioritize a short-term gain over long-term
potential adverse privacy impacts is a negative one, this model argues that the
person who values the data more is able to exercise control where they want
to, and ignore it when they do not and simply access the service.129  Compa-
nies that value the personal information because of their monetization
efforts will expend more effort to get it, and each person’s willingness to
enforce their data privacy rights accurately reflects how much they value this
data.
However, reliance on user consent does not address the informational
asymmetry between the company and the consumer, meaning that the
choice to allow a company to collect personal information is based on an
inaccurate assessment.  Even users of Google that turn off their location ser-
123 Id. at 431.
124 See Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 1735–36; Solove, supra note 119, at 1901.
125 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/
S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544 (2008).
126 Woodrow Hartzog, Are Privacy Laws Deficient?, 2 INT’L J. FOR DATA PROT. OFFICER,
PRIV. OFFICER & PRIV. COUNS., no. 10, 2018, at 17, 17 (2018) (“While major privacy failures
grab the headlines, the most significant corrosive force on our privacy is often barely
noticeable, like death from a thousand cuts.”); see also Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55,
at 1735.
127 See Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1327, 1328–29, 1350 (2012) (discussing how consumers both are the product and help
create the product, their digital profiles, in the market for personal data).
128 See id. at 1329 (arguing that the “right to rescind enrollment in [a social networking
service], triggering a deletion of information shared with the service, and an ability to
export information shared with the service are appropriate given the skewed aspects of
personal information transactions.”).
129 See Solove, supra note 119, at 1896, 1899–900.
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vices are still tracked by Google using triangulation from cell towers.130  Still,
those in favor of this model suggest that the commodification of personal
information is necessary to facilitate transnational commerce.131  As the fol-
lowing report illustrates, companies have a profit motive to collect as much
personal data as possible and will use deceptive design tactics to induce con-
sumers to consent to the use, sale, or collection of their personal data.  This
reinforces one of the benefits of enacting a federal data privacy act focused
on design at all, namely, that companies will be left to less self-regulation and
forced to implement baseline protections for consumer data before turning
to user controls.
2. Google, Facebook, and Microsoft as Case Studies in Undermining User
Control
The Norwegian Consumer Council’s (Forbrukarrådet’s) report issued in
2018 analyzed the privacy protections for users of Facebook, Google, and
Microsoft.132  The report demonstrates the information asymmetry between
the companies and their consumers and shows that the consumer begins with
a disadvantage because they are asked to share personal information without
a true understanding of how it will be used.133  Users tend to trade short-
term gains, such as access to a website, for potentially longer term loss of
privacy and these efforts to nudge consumers to allow access to their personal
information can become “ethically problematic . . . and deprive [consumers]
of their agency.”134  This renders the user’s “consent” to the use and collec-
tion of their personal data meaningless due to deceptive design practices.
To illustrate what is meant by deception in design, after the GDPR went
into effect, companies notified their users of new privacy policies using pop-
up windows.  In the Norwegian Consumer Council’s report, using screen-
shots from Facebook’s GDPR notification to its users, the two options
presented to users were “Manage Data Settings” in faded gray font next to
“Accept and Continue” in bright blue.135  If a user wanted to control their
settings regarding personalized advertising based on Facebook’s use of third-
party data, they needed to select “Manage Data Settings”—the less prominent
option.  But, clicking “Accept and Continue”—standing out in a bright
color—resulted in the automatic activation of the setting and authorized
Facebook to use data from third parties to show them personalized advertise-
ments.136  Users who chose “Accept and Continue” did not get to see what
130 See Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 111, at 303.
131 See Solove, supra note 119, at 1896 (noting that some view restrictions on businesses
that rely on sale of data to provide their online content as “paternalistic”).
132 FORBRUKARRÅDET, supra note 1, at 3; see also Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 111,
at 301–03 (finding that people have definite and nuanced expectations of privacy depend-
ing on the context of the platform being used).
133 FORBRUKARRÅDET, supra note 1, at 6.
134 Id. at 7.
135 Id. at 14.
136 Id.
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the default setting was before they selected it, which the report calls “hidden
defaults.”137
Additionally, the choice presented to users was whether Facebook would
use data from third parties to show them personalized ads, which is a limited
scope of control when compared to other ways Facebook processes and col-
lects data from third parties and does not inform the consumer of other ways
third-party data may be used.138  Even after choosing to restrict this setting,
the pop-up continued with a disclaimer that if the user has given their con-
tact information to a third party and Facebook matches it to their Facebook
profile, Facebook may still use that data to show the user personalized adver-
tisements.139  This example illustrates how design choices influence both
whether users exercise control at all and how effective those choices really
are.  These types of design choices may remain overlooked by basing regula-
tion on illusory consent mechanisms and undermine their effectiveness.
B. Federal Regulation Will Provide a Minimum Standard of Data Privacy
Safeguards
In his opening remarks to the House Energy and Commerce Committee
in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica and Facebook data disclosures, Rep-
resentative Frank Pallone stated, “We need comprehensive privacy and data
security legislation.  We need baseline protections that stretch from internet
service providers to data brokers to app developers and to anyone else who
makes a living off our data.”140  Implementing a federal regulation that
requires companies to comply with specific minimum standards of data
processing provides a baseline from which to address the growing industry of
processing personal data.141  The benefits to providing a minimum central-
ized standard within the United States include harmonization of internal pol-
icy and reduced costs for businesses that operate in multiple states.  These
outweigh the costs of decreased ability for states to experiment and lowered
ability to tailor regulations to certain sectors; by implementing a minimum, it
will preserve room for states’ laws to build on the protections.142  Because of
its different approach to data privacy, a U.S. federal data privacy act will not
137 Id. at 14–15 (noting that Google also frequently has these “hidden default” mecha-
nisms to prime users to make specific choices and maximize data sharing with third
parties).
138 Id. at 33 (“Facebook is an enormous ecosystem for collecting and processing data
about the user.  Therefore, the option to stop only the use of data from third parties for
personalised ads is a far cry from switching off personalisation of ads.”).
139 Id. at 33–34.
140 Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy
& Com., 115th Cong. 6 (2018) (statement of Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., Ranking Member, H.
Comm. on Energy & Com.).
141 See Hartzog, supra note 122, at 431–32.
142 See Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 1716; cf. Chander et al., supra note 27, at
1797–99 (“New federal privacy law could provide a nationwide floor, permitting states to
intervene only to the extent that they raise privacy standards further.  This allows state
innovations and experimentation.”); see also supra Part III.
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reflect the same protections as the GDPR.143  This leads to the external bene-
fit of placing the United States in the global conversation surrounding data
privacy and increases debate surrounding the best way to regulate these
issues, leading to broader consensus in the future.
1. A Third Agreement Between the United States and European Union
Will Likely Also Be Struck Down
The market pressures on both jurisdictions to facilitate cross-border data
transfers mean that they will have to come to some sort of agreement.  If its
framework incorporates different principles than those in the GDPR, which
is likely, the United States’ approach will compete with the GDPR in the
global sphere.144  This will force the parties to negotiate and compromise or
risk losing out on large segments of the global market if businesses choose to
operate in only one economic area.  The surveillance issues present in both
Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield can only be resolved with a shift in U.S.
national security policies, making a third agreement unlikely to succeed.
With a federal law, the United States is better positioned to establish its ade-
quacy because, although the Schrems II standard is “essentially equivalent,”
the CJEU clarified that it did not need to be identical so long as there are
effective and enforceable rights for data subjects in the EU.145
2. Reliance on the CCPA/CPRA Is Not Enough to Certify the United
States as Adequate
An unanswered question that remains after Schrems II is whether a single
U.S. state could be deemed an adequate jurisdiction alone—for example,
California and the CCPA/CPRA could potentially be evaluated indepen-
dently of any federal U.S. framework.  The consequence of this would be that
by complying with the CCPA/CPRA, businesses located in California would
be treated as complying with the GDPR.  Because the CCPA/CPRA is already
likely to become the de facto governing standard for businesses in the United
States due to California’s outsized market share,146 this raises questions
about the consequences of that adequacy decision for companies operating
in other states and the interaction of state and federal legal systems.  The
idea of an end run around a federal privacy framework is appealing for its
avoidance of the drawn-out process involved in enacting federal law.147  The
passage of the CPRA strengthens this argument because it creates a separate
enforcement agency to oversee the provisions and expands the private right
143 See Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 1692; Kerry & Chin, supra note 5.
144 See Chander et al., supra note 27, at 1737 (“California has emerged as a kind of
privacy superregulator. . . . [California r]ather than the supernational EU . . . is now driv-
ing privacy in a significant part of the world. . . .”); Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at
1692 (“The GDPR has called the U.S. government’s hand.”).
145 See supra Sections II.B–C.
146 Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 1712.
147 See Chander et al., supra note 27, 1797–99.
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of action outlined in the CCPA.148  However, even if the European Commis-
sion considered certifying a sector or state rather than an entire country, the
private right of action is only available to California residents—it lacks an
effective and enforceable remedy that Schrems II requires for a jurisdiction to
be “essentially equivalent” to the GDPR because EU citizens and citizens of
other states cannot access the mechanism.149  The definition of personal
information that can provide the basis for the action is also far narrower than
that in the GDPR, making it unlikely that the European Commission would
certify the jurisdiction as adequate even if companies followed the CCPA/
CPRA.
By creating an independent data protection agency, one of the reasons
that both Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield were invalidated in the Schrems
cases, the CPRA’s impact on the continued development of U.S. privacy law
relative to the EU remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
The current uncertainty that businesses located in the United States face
regarding the lawfulness of cross-border data transfers between the United
States and European Union stems from a different approach to regulation of
data privacy.  States in the United States have further complicated the situa-
tion—with California passing the CCPA/CPRA and as other states follow suit,
the varied approaches to data privacy will only increase.  The invalidation of
Privacy Shield has reduced the mechanisms available to share data across the
Atlantic and subjected the use of standard contractual clauses to a case-by-
case inquiry.  This domestic and global patchwork imposes costs and poten-
tial liability on businesses.
Moving forward in the sphere of data privacy regulation, the United
States might value maintaining the sectoral approach as it allows for flexibil-
ity and meeting the needs of each industry on its own terms, allowing self-
regulation where appropriate.  However, Schrems II illustrates that despite
attempts to self-regulate and allow private companies to contract among
themselves in using standard contractual clauses, the GDPR compliance
inquiry will entail an evaluation of the country’s overall level of data protec-
tion in each cross-border transfer that takes place even with SCCs.  Private
companies face a high degree of uncertainty in their contract negotiations,
regarding whether they need supplemental clauses beyond the SCCs and
what form supplemental materials should take.  Large corporations that
engage in business around the globe may find themselves facing negotiations
for massive numbers of individual contracts.
148 California Voters Adopt the California Privacy Rights Act, supra note 50.
149 See, e.g., European Commission Press Release IP/19/421, European Commission
Adopts Adequacy Decision on Japan, Creating the World’s Largest Area of Safe Data Flows
(Jan. 23, 2019) (explaining that two of the key reasons for the adequacy decision were a
“complaint-handling mechanism” for European citizens supervised by an independent
data authority and additional safeguards for companies to follow, also enforced by an inde-
pendent data authority).
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Generally, separate jurisdictions have an ability to enact contradictory or
potentially confusing legislation, regardless of the compliance costs it may
impose on businesses.  The case for data privacy is distinct from the general
ability to merely regulate differently.  In an increasingly interconnected
world, global commerce is driven by and dependent on the use of the
internet.  Uniformity, or at the least consistency and centralization, is key to
the continuation of international trade.  The European Union has already
enacted the GDPR to govern the personal data of its data subjects, and its
influence on the global market has resulted in most businesses complying
out of necessity.  Its framework and application in Schrems I and Schrems II,
which deems other jurisdictions “adequate” if they are “essentially
equivalent” to the GDPR, means that the European Commission will shut off
a massive segment of world consumers to private businesses after evaluating
another country’s domestic policies and finding them inferior to their own.
Schrems II implies that a third workaround using a self-certification agree-
ment between the United States and the European Union would be struck
down for similar reasons as Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield.  Having a central-
ized U.S. federal data privacy law provides a baseline for evaluating the
United States as a potentially “equivalent” jurisdiction to the GDPR in level of
data protection.  Although the U.S. version of a data privacy law is unlikely to
be substantively similar to the GDPR, recent proposed bills indicate reliance
on similar principles of data governance that could provide common ground
in the future.150  The United States should use this opportunity to bring the
benefits of a different history of data privacy to the global conversation on
data privacy.
150 See Kerry & Chin, supra note 5 (noting that proposed federal data privacy bills pro-
mote “data minimization, individual privacy rights, transparency, and discriminatory uses
of personal data.”).  For a suggested federal data privacy bill that draws from several prior
bills, see generally CAMERON F. KERRY, JOHN B. MORRIS, JR., CAITLIN T. CHIN & NICOL E.
TURNER LEE, BROOKINGS. INST., BRIDGING THE GAPS: A PATH FORWARD TO FEDERAL PRIVACY
LEGISLATION (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bridging-
the-gaps_a-path-forward-to-federal-privacy-legislation.pdf.
